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Abstract 
Hungary implemented a number of new policies from the late 1980s to the early 1990s, 
shifting from a centrally planned economy to a market economy. Despite the top-down 
market reforms, Hungary lacked the knowledge to build a fully functional financial system. 
Eventually, an economic turmoil caused by the collapse of eastern markets and fragility in 
the financial system led to the banking crisis of 1992–1993, revealing the 
undercapitalization of the financial system. The government implemented the 
recapitalization, or “bank consolidation,” as part of a stabilization program. It injected 
capital into banks in three stages—in December 1993, May 1994, and December 1994—so 
that their capital ratios would be raised to the 8% Basel accord minimum. The government 
expected recapitalization to address imprudent lending behaviors (the flow problem) by 
tying receipt of the funds with banks’ commitment to improve their risk management and 
controls. The asset purchase could only improve the quality of banks’ existing portfolios 
(the stock problem). Banks were required to submit restructuring plans (“consolidation 
plans”) upon participating in the capital injection, although some banks received the capital 
even if they did not provide adequate plans. Along with the recapitalization program, 
prudential regulation and accounting standards were amended. The recapitalization was 
successful overall, although larger banks benefited more than smaller banks. 
Keywords: broad-based, broad-based, capital injection, capital injection, centrally planned 
economy, Hungary, transition economy 
  
 
1 This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project 
modules considering broad-based capital injection programs. Cases are available from the Journal of Financial 
Crises at   
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/. 




At a Glance 
Prior to the transition to a market 
economy, the banking system in Hungary 
was based on a “monobank” system, 
under which the majority of the financial 
services were provided by the National 
Bank of Hungary (Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 
or MNB) (Neale and Bozski 2001, 148). 
As in other centrally planned economies, 
lending and credit creation in Hungary 
were often politically determined. To 
transition toward an open-market-
oriented economy, Hungary 
implemented a number of new policies 
from the late 1980s to the early 1990s. 
For instance, in 1986, Hungary 
introduced a two-tier banking system, 
separating the central bank from newly 
chartered, state-owned commercial 
banks, thereby separating monetary 
policy from commercial financial 
intermediation (Neale and Bozski 2001, 
149, 150–51). In and after 1991, Hungary 
introduced the Accounting Act (which set 
new accounting standards), the 
Bankruptcy Act, and the Banking Act 
(which addressed loan qualification, 
regulations on provisions, and other 
microprudential policies) (Tang, Zoli, and 
Klytchnikova 2000, 13). 
Despite the top-down market reforms, 
Hungary lacked the knowledge to build a 
fully functional financial system. 
Commercial banks struggled with 
nonperforming loans that were inherited 
from the MNB during the socialist system 
(Balassa 1996, 23). Commercial bank 
managers and supervisors lacked 
knowledge and management skills, which 
further deteriorated banks’ balance 
sheets. As many other transitioning 
countries, Hungary hired International Monetary Fund (IMF) experts, advisors, and 
economists but with moderate achievements. Eventually, the economic turmoil caused by 
the collapse of eastern markets revealed the undercapitalization and fragility in the 
financial system and led to the banking crisis of 1992–1993 (Balassa 1996, 23). Between 
1990 and 1993, real GDP in Hungary fell by approximately 20% (Nováková 2003, 24). 
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: To assist firms and to inject capital into banks 
to raise their capital ratios to the 8% Basel accord 
minimum (Neale and Bozski 2001, 153). 
Launch Dates   December 1993, May 1994, 
December 1994 (IMF 1995, 
155)  
Usage Total: HUF 169.1 billion 
($1.3 billion) (IMF 1995) 
Eligibility Banks whose capital ratios 
did not meet the regulatory 
standards in each phase. The 
rule was flexible, and larger 
banks tended to receive more 
capital (Balassa 1996, 15) 
Administrator Government, mostly led by the 
Ministry of Finance 
Legal Authority The recapitalization process 
was authorized by the Bank 
Consolidation Act of 1994. 
Parliament passed each 
process, taking a step-by-step 
approach (Balassa 1996, 32) 
Notable Features The recapitalization was 
implemented in three stages 
(December 1993, May 1994, 
and December 1994) (IMF 
1995, 155); the 
recapitalization prepared 
banks for privatization and 
purchase by foreign investors 
(Bonin and Schaffer 1995, 73) 
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According to the then newly introduced accounting and regulatory standards, as of 
December 31, 1993, nonperforming loans amounted to HUF 418 billion, approximately 
more than 70% of the loans in the financial system (Balassa 1996, 13). (See Figure1; IMF 
1995, 154.) 
Figure 1: Hungary Banks’ Loan Portfolios, 1991–1994 
 
Source: IMF 1995. 
Consequently, the government implemented a number of stabilization measures, including 
nonperforming loan purchases in 1992–1993 (Dreyer 2021), privatization, and foreign 
ownership takeover in 1995–1997. One of these stabilization measures was the 
recapitalization program in December 1993, and May and December 1994, in which the 
government provided new capital by acquiring common stock or subordinated loans issued 
by the commercial banks.3 
The previous governmental intervention, an asset purchase program from 1992 to 1993, 
turned out to be insufficient to remedy banks’ impaired balance sheets; thus, alternative 
approaches to address the nonperforming loans were considered (Balassa 1996, 13; 
Dreyer 2021; IMF 1995, 147). Consequently, the government planned the recapitalization 
package based on advice from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
(Balassa 1996, 13). The recapitalization was expected to stop existing imprudent lending 
behaviors and improve bank governance by requiring banks to sign agreements with the 
government, while the asset purchase program could only improve the quality of banks’ 
existing portfolios (IMF 1995, 147). 
The government recapitalized banks over three stages (Neale and Bozski 2001, 153). (See 
Figure 2.) First, in December 1993, capital was injected into eight participating banks 
 
3 Note that the recapitalization program is sometimes referred as “bank consolidation.” 
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(Magyar Hitel Bank [MHB], Kereskedelmi és Hitelbank [K&H], Budapest Bank [BB], 
Mezobank, Takarekbank, Agrobank, Dunabank, and Iparbankhaz) to raise their capital 
adequacy ratios to 0%, from an estimated negative 15%. Second, in May 1994, capital was 
injected to the three largest banks (MHB, K&H, and BB) and four other smaller banks so 
that their capital ratios would reach 4% (IMF 1995, 155; Neale and Bozski 2001, 153). 
Lastly, in December 1994, four large state-owned banks received a capital injection to 
boost their capital ratio to 8%. While the first two capital injections took the form of equity 
purchase by the government, the last capital injections of December 1994 took the form of 
30-year subordinated loans from the government (IMF 1995, 149). In exchange for the 
recapitalization, banks committed to reforms, which ultimately prepared them for 
privatization (Neale and Bozski 2001, 153). As shown in Figure 2, while the estimation 
varies amongst literature, approximately HUF 165 billion to HUF 180 billion was injected 
throughout the recapitalization process. It cost approximately 5% of Hungarian GDP (IMF 
1995, 155; Nováková 2003, 27). 
Figure 2: Hungary Consolidation Usage Amount 
 
Note: CCBs are “credit-consolidation bonds.” 
Source: IMF 1995. 
Summary Evaluation 
While the asset purchase scheme prior to the recapitalization program was considered 
ineffective (Dreyer 2021), the capital injection program has received positive evaluations 
from a number of studies (IMF 1995; Neale and Bozski 2001). The confidence of domestic 
depositors as well as foreign investors recovered, and Hungary benefited from the 
subsequent high capital inflow per capita (Neale and Bozski 2001). 
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Balassa (1996) finds that the recapitalization was successful overall, though the successes 
seemed to be unevenly spread. Large banks that were recapitalized avoided bankruptcy, 
saw positive cash flow, and had their capital adequacy ratios improved. However, smaller 
banks that received limited capital did not necessarily see much recovery on their balance 
sheets and suffered from persistent losses (Balassa 1996). 
On the other hand, Bonin and Schaffer (1995) criticize the design of the recapitalization 
scheme. First, they argue that, though the first capital injection, in December 1993, was 
meant to boost the capital adequacy ratios of participating banks to at least 0%, five of the 
eight banks still had negative capital adequacy ratios at the end of 1993 after taking 
account of this first tranche recapitalization (Bonin and Schaffer 1995). Furthermore, 
Bonin and Schaffer (1995) note that the design of the recapitalization was flawed, given 
that banks with low capital received more capital support, regardless of their bad capital 
management in the past, and argue that the plan could have been designed better if the 
government had considered future foreign investors and the privatization process. 
The restructuring measures, including the recapitalization, were inevitably costly. Until the 
end of 1994, approximately HUF 330 billion worth of “consolidation government bonds” 
were issued. By mid-1996, the value of the consolidation government bonds issued reached 
HUF 360 billion, increasing the gross debt of the country. The debt service further 
burdened the government’s budget. The net interest payments on government bonds 
reached approximately 1.2% of GDP in 1994 and further rose to 1.6% of GDP in 1995 
(Balassa 1996). 
As a result of the recapitalization, the government’s direct ownership of banks increased 
significantly. According to the IMF (1995), as a result of the two capital injections in 
December 1993 and May 1994, the state ownership share in seven of the eight 
participating banks rose sharply, to more than 75%. The state ownership share of large 
participating banks was well above the legal maximum (25%) mandated by the Act on 
Financial Institutions, and therefore, the target date to reduce state ownership below the 
legal maximum was extended to 1997. For the banking sector as a whole, the share owned 
directly by the state increased from 38% at end-1991 to more than 67% at end-1994 (IMF 
1995). 
Lastly, the recapitalization and consecutive reforms, particularly the regulatory reforms, 
changed the market shares of banks; for instance, according to Neale and Bozski (2001), 
the share of corporate lending of Magyar Hitel Bank dropped from 50% to 7% as a result of 
multiple reforms and increasing competition in the sector. 
The multiple reforms were authorized by a combination of banking, accounting, and 
bankruptcy laws, an overhaul that shifted the entire Hungarian financial system. As Dreyer 
(2021) explains, in December 1991, the Hungarian government introduced the Banking 
Act, which required banks to reach a capital adequacy ratio of 8% by 1994 and accumulate 
loan-loss reserves. This act also introduced three categories for rating loan portfolios (Ábel 
and Bonin 1993) and established the State Banking Supervisory Agency (SBS) (Borish et al. 
1996). The establishment of the Banking Act was followed by the enactment of a new 
bankruptcy law, which became effective on January 1, 1992, requiring any company with 
any outstanding debt that was more than 90 days in arrears to initiate bankruptcy 
proceedings (Ábel and Bonin 1993).   
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Hungary Context 1991–1994 
GDP 
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU converted to 
USD) 
$33.4 billion in 1991 (HUF 
2,498.3 bn) 
$37.3 billion in 1992 (HUF 
2942.6 bn) 
$38.6 billion in 1993 (HUF 
3548.3 bn) 
$41.5 billion in 1994 (HUF 
4364.8 bn) 
GDP per capita 
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU converted to 
USD) 
$3,219.77 in 1991 
$3,597.11 in 1992 
$3,726.83 in 1993 
$4013.94 in 1994 
Sovereign credit rating (five-year senior 
debt) 
Data not available in 1991–1994 
Size of banking system 
 
$28.2 billion in banking system 
assets in 1991 
$28.9 billion in banking system 
assets in 1992 
$28.6 billion in banking system 
assets in 1993 
$29.2 billion in banking system 
assets in 1994 
Size of banking system as a percentage of 
GDP 
 
Banking system assets equal to 
84.4% of 1991 GDP 
Banking system assets equal to 
77.3% of 1992 GDP 
Banking system assets equal to 
74.1% of 1993 GDP 
Banking system assets equal to 
70.4% of 1994 GDP 
Size of banking system as a percentage of 
financial system 
Data not available in 1991–1994 
Five-bank concentration of banking system 
41.5% of total assets in 1991 
43.7% of total assets in 1992 
42.7% of total assets in 1993 
38.6% of total assets in 1993 
Foreign involvement in banking system 
14.7% foreign or jointly owned 
in 1991 
15.3% foreign or jointly owned 
in 1992 
28% foreign or jointly owned in 
1993 
31.1% foreign or jointly owned 
in 1994 
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Government ownership of banking system 
90% majority ownership 
(assets) in 1990 
27% majority ownership 
(assets) in 1995 
Existence of deposit insurance 
“Until 1993 deposits were 
unlimitedly guaranteed by the 
state” 
Source: Ábel and Szakadát 1997, 161; Borish et al. 1996, 11, Hungarian National 
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Key Design Decisions 
1. Part of a Package: The recapitalization of Hungarian banks was part of 
“consolidation” initiatives by the government in early 1990s that also included 
purchasing nonperforming assets and restructuring state-owned debtors. 
The recapitalization of Hungarian banks in early 1990s was part of “consolidation” that 
began in mid-1992. The consolidation took three forms (Neale and Bozski 2001): 
Asset purchases—Asset purchases through the Loan Consolidation Program involved 
substituting bad debt for long-dated (20-year) Treasury bonds with a variable interest rate, 
linked to the Treasury bill yield of the previous quarter (see Dreyer 2021). 
Recapitalization—The government recapitalized banks by purchasing common stock or 
subordinated loans. 
Debtor restructuring—This process endowed capital directly to banks’ debtors to improve 
their financial conditions preparatory to their own privatizations. 
Each process took several stages. The recapitalization was implemented over three stages: 
in December 1993, May 1994, and December 1994 (IMF 1995). Balassa (1996) argues that 
the step-by-step approach taken by the government had negative consequences. The 
author argues that uncertainty, combined with the slowness of the legislation process, may 
have led to technical complications and a decline in efficiency. Balassa further argues that 
the slow and politically turbulent legislative process hindered public understanding of the 
details of the program and the importance of the consolidation processes. The author 
laments that “it might have been more expedient to implement the consolidation of the 
banking sector on the basis of one or more laws . . . Perhaps, had that been the case, less 
mistakes would have been made during its implementation” (Balassa, 1996). 
2.  Legal Authority and Communications: The recapitalization process was 
authorized by the Bank Consolidation Act of 1994. 
The recapitalization process was authorized by the Bank Consolidation Act (Neale and 
Bozski 2001). Yet, Neale and Bozski (2001) argue that the legality of early consolidation 
processes was “flimsy.” The budget law of 1993 authorized the government to issue credit 
consolidation bonds (CCBs) to fund its interventions. The law did not specify the limits of 
issuance and other details; the government took care of such details through executive 
orders. 
3. Administration/Governance: The Ministry of Finance (MOF) took the initiative in 
the consolidation process, as well as in the development of the supervisory and 
regulatory system. 
The Ministry of Finance took the initiative in the consolidation process, as well as in the 
development of the supervisory and regulatory system (Neale and Bozski 2001). 
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4. Eligible Institutions: Capital was injected in financial institutions that did not 
meet capital ratio regulatory requirements. 
Capital was injected in financial institutions that did not meet capital ratio regulatory 
requirements (Balassa 1996). The threshold of the targeted capital adequacy ratio and the 
targeted banks evolved over time. Larger banks and state banks were more likely to receive 
capital. Furthermore, after the second capital injection, in May 1994, participating financial 
institutions were required to submit “consolidation plans,” detailing the modernization of 
business policies, management, and risk management (see the Restructuring Plan section 
for further details) (IMF 1995). 
Prior to the first capital injection, in December 1993, the Ministry of Finance identified 10 
significant financial institutions (Magyar Hitel Bank [MHB], Kereskedelmi és Hitelbank 
[K&H], Budapest Bank [BB], Mezobank, Takarekbank, Agrobank, Dunabank, Iparbankhaz, 
Konzumbank, and Realbank) and further determined whether to inject capital to those 
banks whose capital adequacy ratios were negative (Bonin and Schaffer 1995).4 Realbank 
underwent a management buyout and was privatized, and it became apparent that the 
capital adequacy ratio of Konzumbank was above 8%. Ultimately, the other eight banks 
(MHB, K&H, BB, Mezobank, Takarekbank, Agrobank, Dunabank, and Iparbankhaz) received 




4 Furthermore, some savings cooperatives and other smaller-scale banks from the consolidation program and 
the “sour sixteen,” selected large state-owned institutions employing in excess of 7% of the industrial labor 
force, were also included (Bonin and Schaffer 1995). 
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Figure 3: Banks’ Capital Adequacy Ratios (CARs) below Zero after the Capital Injection in 
December 1993  
 
Note: A=Agrobank, BB=Budapest Bank, D=Dunabank, I=Iparbankhaz, K&H=Kereskedelmi és Hitelbank, 
M=Mezobank, MHB=Magyar Hitel Bank, and T=Takarekbank. 
Source: Bonin and Schaffer 1995, 69. 
In the second injection, in May 1994, banks with capital adequacy ratios below 4% were 
eligible. The Ministry of Finance injected capital so that banks’ capital adequacy ratios 
would reach 4%. Finally, in the third injection, in December 1994, four large state-owned 
banks received capital so that their capital adequacy ratios would reach 8%, the ratio 
required by Bank for International Settlements rules (Balassa 1996). The Basel accord 
called for a minimum ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets of 8% to be implemented by 
the end of 1992. This framework was introduced not only in Group of Ten countries but 
also in virtually all countries. Hungarian banks were required to reach a capital adequacy 
ratio of 8% by 1994. 
There were a few exceptions to the eligibility rule. For instance, in May 1994, the National 
Savings and Commercial Bank (Országos Takarék Pénztár, or OTP), one of the largest 
commercial banks, received a HUF 5 billion capital injection twice in 1993 and 1994, even 
though its capital adequacy ratio had already exceeded 4% and even though it was not 
designated as one of 10 banks nominated by the government in December 1993 (IMF 
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1995). Furthermore, smaller banks did not participate in the last round of capital 
injections, in December 1994, as it was assumed the smaller banks would be able to raise 
their capital ratios through privatization and partnerships with larger banks (Ábel and 
Szakadát 1997). The deviation in implementation varied with discretionary governmental 
judgments. 
5. Size: There was no preannounced size of the injection, but the government 
injected approximately HUF 165 billion to HUF 180 billion (equivalent to 5% of 
then GDP) of capital over the three stages. The recapitalization process cost 
approximately 5% of Hungarian GDP in 1993. 
While estimations vary, approximately HUF 165 billion to HUF 180 billion was injected 
throughout the recapitalization process. It was approximately 5% of Hungarian GDP in 
1993 (IMF 1995; Nováková 2003). The first capital injection, in December 1993, was the 
largest in terms of size, totaling more than HUF 100 billion (see Figure 2 in the “At a 
Glance” section above). 
6. Source of Injections: The government issued more than HUF 350 billion in credit 
consolidation bonds to inject capital. 
The budget law of 1993 authorized the government to issue credit consolidation bonds. 
The CCBs issued under the budget law of 1993 had a maturity of 20 years, and interest was 
to be paid twice yearly, compared to the formerly issued CCBs, which paid interest once a 
year (Ábel and Bonin 1992; IMF 1995). CCBs were deployed both in the loan consolidation 
program (see Dreyer 2021) and the recapitalization program (IMF 1995). In the 
recapitalization, the government acquired the equity in the banks by purchasing newly 
issued shares with CCBs (IMF 1995). 
Until the end of 1994, approximately HUF 330 billion worth of CCBs were issued by the 
government, and by mid-1996, the number reached HUF 360 billion (Balassa 1996). The 
CCBs were also used (1) to purchase HUF 1.9 billion in equity from existing commercial 
bank shareholders; (2) to grant the savings cooperatives HUF 5.9 billion in subordinated 
loans and to increase their capital by HUF 2.7 billion; and (3) to grant the OTP a HUF 5 
billion subordinated loan (IMF 1995. 
While the state later sold some of the banks above their book values after the recovery, the 
cost of the consolidation (including other nonrecapitalization measures) was expensive, 
burdening the state budget. As Figure 4 shows, despite the successful privatizations, the 
total proceeds (HUF 98.9 billion) from selling the privatized banks covered only 35% of the 
consolidation costs (Neale and Bozski 2001). 
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Figure 4: Privatization Revenue Relative to Consolidation Cost  
 
Note: Postabank was privatized in 2003. 
Source: Neale and Bozski 2001, 166. 
7. Individual Participation Limits: There seem to have been no fixed participation 
limits. 
There seem to have been no fixed participation limits. 
8. Capital Characteristics: The Ministry of Finance recapitalized the banks using 
two methods: equity acquisition and the extension of 30-year subordinated loans 
from the government. 
The first capital injection, in December 1993, took the form of voting shares. The 
government recapitalized eight banks by purchasing newly issued banks’ common stocks 
with CCBs (IMF 1995). The second capital injection, in May 1994, took a mixed form. For 
the three large banks, capital was injected by acquiring additional common stocks with 
voting shares so that their capital ratios would reach 4%. For the four smaller banks, the 
Ministry of Finance acquired voting shares to increase capital to a 2% capital ratio level; 
the remaining 2% was filled with subordinated loans (Balassa 1996). 
The third capital injection, in December 1994, took the form of a 30-year subordinated 
loan. In order to offset the budgetary impact of the lending, interest payments on CCBs and 
on the subordinated loans were adjusted (IMF 1995). 
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Figure 5: Expenditure on Consolidation 1992–1994 (HUF millions) 
 
Source: Neale and Bozski 2001, 155. 
9.  Restructuring Plan (1): As a precondition of the May 1994 recapitalization, 
banks were required to submit medium-term restructuring programs, or 
“consolidation plans.” 
As a precondition of the May 1994 recapitalization, banks were required to submit 
“consolidation plans.” The consolidation plans prescribed management strategies for bank 
reorganization and required the banks to participate actively in enterprise debt resolution 
programs (Balassa, 1996; IMF 1995). The enterprise debt resolution program involved 
determining the circle of clients to be dealt with in the course of debtor conciliation, 
another program run by the government (Balassa 1996). The agreements based on the 
consolidation plans also detailed certain bank restructuring procedures on an individual 
(bank-by-bank) basis (Bonin and Schaffer 1995). 
Amongst three banks that received capital in December 1994, only BB had submitted a 
consolidation program acceptable to the government by the end of 1994. The government 
rejected the plans submitted by MHB and K&H. These two banks submitted revised 
consolidation plans and eventually replaced top management in late 1994 and early 1995, 
in order to obtain the government’s approval. With some delay, all banks, including MHB 
and K&H, received the capital (IMF 1995; Neale and Bozski 2001). 
10. Restructuring Plan (2): The majority of banks established separate units or 
departments to deal with capital injections and nonperforming loans. 
148
The Hungarian Bank Recapitalization Program Oguri
 
Establishing separate units effectively prepared banks to separate their “good 
banks” from “bad banks” for privatization. 
The majority of banks created a separate internal or external workout unit to deal with the 
nonperforming loans. Separating the liquidation process from normal bank business not 
only avoided unintended disruptions in the financial system but also prepared banks for 
privatization by separating “good banks” from “bad banks.” Some banks sold their 
nonperforming loans to private liquidation organizations (Nováková 2003). For instance, in 
order to deal with their nonperforming loans, Budapest Bank formed 2B Ltd., K&H and 
Mezobank jointly set up Kvantumbank, and MHB established Risk Ltd. (Neale and Bozski 
2001). 
11. Exit Strategy: An exit strategy was not announced, but the goal was to privatize 
the commercial banks. 
No further detail was found for this Key Design Decision. 
12. Other Regulatory Changes: As a part of banking sector reform, prudential 
regulation as well as accounting standards were amended. 
In the 1990s, Hungary adopted new banking sector reform policies, including updated 
banking, accounting, and bankruptcy laws, overhauling the entire Hungarian financial 
system. In December 1991, the Hungarian government introduced the Banking Act, which 
required banks to reach a capital adequacy ratio of 8% by 1994 and accumulate loan-loss 
reserves (Ábel and Szakadát 1997; Dreyer 2021). This act also introduced three categories 
for rating loan portfolios (Ábel and Bonin 1993) and established the State Banking 
Supervisory Agency (Borish et al. 1996). The establishment of the Banking Act was 
followed by the enactment of a new bankruptcy law, which became effective on January 1, 
1992, requiring any company with any outstanding debt that was more than 90 days in 
arrears to initiate bankruptcy proceedings (Ábel and Bonin 1993). 
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